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Clinical Decision Making Part I: Errors of 
Commission and Omission 




Clinical decision making refers to any act of diagnosis that leads to a decision regarding 
prognosis, treatment, referral, or counseling. Diagnosis itself passes through a series of 
stages, beginning with the assessment of symptoms. However, the meaning of symptoms 
varies greatly with the context. For example, diagnostic outcomes for cough presenting in 
general practice differ from those seen in the context of a chest clinic. Persons presenting 
with severe headache at a neurology clinic are more likely to have a brain tumor than 
those presenting with a similar complaint in an emergency clinic.  
 
In light of presenting symptoms, the clinician then proceeds to the stage of diagnostic 
hypotheses, generally restricting the serious possibilities to less than four (said to relate 
more to the limitations of short term memory than to the intrinsic validity of any such 
restriction).1 He or she then attempts to use available evidence to differentiate among 
these hypotheses. Ideally, this leads to isolating a single diagnostic entity. Consequent 
upon this, a prognosis is made, and a course of treatment identified. However, potential 
for error exists at all stages in this process, and actions, whether valid or invalid, have 
consequences.  
 
The Use and Abuse of Frequency Statistics  
That statistics influence perceptions in medical practice has long been recognized. 
Almost 50 years ago, one exponent told the following story2 of a friend who came one 
day and asked, "A member of my family has to be hospitalized. How can I tell what 
hospital to put him in?" Being head of a hospital activity study at the time, he answered, 
"We'll just see which hospital is the safest to go into. We have 15 hospitals which have 
been contributing some data. Let's see which reports the greatest percentages of 
recoveries on discharge." He drew attention to Hospital #1, where 92% of patients 
recovered and Hospital #14, where only 28% recovered, and stated: "Obviously, there 
isn't any sense in going to Hospital 14, you've only got a 1 in 4 chance of getting out of 
there cured!"  
 
The author then conceded the inherent oversimplification, pointing out that if frequency 
statistics are to help in decision making, words must mean the same in every setting, and 
statistics must be accurate and reflect actual practice.2 Since then, even more important 
issues have been recognized, such as the critical relevance of caseload characteristics: is 
it a general hospital or a referral hospital? is it private or public sector? do patients arrive 
with similar or different prognostic profiles? These considerations pertain to what may be 
termed the "prior probability" of differing outcomes.  
 For example, in most countries public sector health care administrators are required to 
balance demand for different types of services against the available and finite supply of 
resources. This usually results in a limited availability and turnaround for certain 
procedures and services while maintaining affordability for a wide cross-section of the 
catchment population. Therefore, is it ever reasonable to compare health outcomes of a 
public sector hospital with those of a private sector hospital, without first taking account 
of pre-admission prognosis? The issues include: socioeconomic spectrum of people 
accessing health care from a given source, the stage at which disease presents (is it more 
or less advanced), and how much will cost of medication be a barrier. These same issues 
are equally relevant when comparing one physician's practice with another; those serving 
wealthier patients will inevitably achieve apparently more favorable outcomes than those 
who are dealing mostly with poor patients. Frequency statistics therefore are merely 
numbers: for interpretation they must be placed in context, and only after controlling for 
the relevant factors can valid comparisons be made. 
 
The Role of Moral Judgements in Medical Diagnosis  
 
The human factor in clinical decision making in the face of uncertainty has also received 
attention. Especially in the absence of evidence, informal norms (or "rules of thumb") are 
often adopted in medical diagnosis. The most important norm has long been recognized: 
"that judging a sick person well is more to be avoided than judging a well person sick".3 
By contrast, an opposite analogy of common law in the face of uncertainty holds that: "A 
man is innocent until proven guilty"; in effect, the judge must find compelling evidence 
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The error to avoid is to erroneously convict, as in the 
dictum, "Better a thousand guilty men go free, than one innocent man be convicted".  
Unlike common law, whose foundations rest on a null hypothesis of innocence, the 
medical profession traditionally abides by a converse rule. Because medicine is 
concerned mostly with people in the "sick role", the null hypothesis, Ho ("H nought"), is 
usually taken as no difference between the individual being assessed and others with the 
disease; after all, physicians deal most of the time with people who are not well, such that 
"not well" is the operational norm. Little wonder therefore that the medical model is more 
noted for its obsession with illness than its interest in health; it is virtually designed to do 
so! However, although the magnitude of the bias towards intervention in a given case 
may be small, if multiplied across a population it can have effects of large magnitude. 
Interestingly, compared with law, medicine offers more leeway with its rule, such as 
"When in doubt, observe and/or delay your decision". This option however, is acceptable 
only when delay is unlikely to lead to catastrophic outcome, and may entail an offsetting 
consideration such as potential adverse consequences of taking immediate action.  
 
The Role of Statistical Inference  
 
To examine this question more closely, we invoke inferential statistics. Taking a clinical 
null hypothesis (i.e. no difference between the person being assessed and others with the 
disease), and basing our decisions on clinical/diagnostic testing, we are liable to make 
two types of errors. Based on their test results, we may decide that a person does not have 
the disease, and thus reject the clinical Ho, when in fact Ho is true (i.e. the individual is 
truly sick); this is construed as a Type 1 error. Alternatively, deciding that the person has 
the disease thereby accepting Ho, when the individual is truly well is termed a Type 2 
error. These two errors can occur by chance alone, and with predictable frequency 
depending on the "normal range" we set for the test results for the population under 
consideration. To repeat, to reject a null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true is 
called a Type 1 error. By contrast, to fail to reject, or to accept the null hypothesis when it 
is false is termed a Type 2 error. Such errors occur routinely in clinical practice. The 
problem is that it is impossible to tell if we are making a Type 1 or a Type 2 error.  
 
From a purely neutral perspective, Ho may be taken on the basis of either health or 
disease, but such neutral positions rarely apply in health care. In fact, most physicians 
learn early in training that it is far more culpable to dismiss a truly sick patient as being 
well, than to classify a well person as sick. Theoretically, what one takes as Ho is 
assumed at the outset: Ho may be taken to mean that disease is present unless 
demonstrated otherwise, or conversely, Ho may be taken to mean that disease is absent. 
More often than not, in clinical medicine (for the reason of medical morality as just 
alluded), Ho assumes that disease is present. A common exception to this is screening, 
where falsely "labeling" someone with a disease is now recognized as an issue; in this 
situation, the null hypothesis of "health" is usually taken, and the implications of Type 1 
and Type 2 error reverse. 
 
Some Classics from the Literature on Diagnostic Errors  
 
There are classics in the medical literature which illustrate the enormous force of the 
decision rule when based on the null hypothesis of disease, and the greater acceptability 
and predominance of Type 2 errors in clinical decision making. For example, as early as 
1959, Garland summarized findings from a study of 14,867 radiographic films for 
tuberculosis.4 In this series there were 1,216 positive readings which turned out to be 
clinically negative (Type 2 errors) and only 24 negative readings which turned out to be 
clinically active (Type 1 errors). Type 2 errors in this series therefore were found to be 
about 50 times more acceptable than that of Type 1 errors!  
 
Rules of thumb however, can propagate Type 2 errors to virtually outrageous proportions. 
To illustrate, take Bakwin's classical 1945 study of tonsillectomy for 1,000 school 
children.5 Of these children, 611 had had their tonsils removed. The remaining 389 were 
then examined by other physicians, and 174 (44.7%) selected for tonsillectomy. This left 
215 children with apparently normal tonsils. Another group of doctors was then assigned 
to examine these 215 children, and 99 of them (46%) were judged in need of 
tonsillectomy. Still another group of doctors was then employed to examine the 
remaining children, and nearly one half were recommended for operation.  
 
These examples illustrate several issues: 1) the null hypothesis of disease and therefore 
Type 2 error dominates; 2) clinical diagnostic practices can amount to little more than 
ritual (in the previous example, an apparent "rule of halves"); 3) errors propagate; 4) it 
takes courage to buck a trend in medical practice; and 5) the surgical equivalent of the 
maxim "when in doubt, diagnose illness", could be stated as "when in doubt, take it out". 
Or perhaps more generally, "it is better to be damned for doing something than for doing 
nothing". This is not medical science.  
The history lessons do not end there. For many years after this study was reported, 
tonsillectomy remained popular. However, this was also accompanied by great ignorance 
on the physiological role of the tonsils, assumed by many to be residual lymphoid tissue 
that performed little useful function. Only after large scale epidemiological studies of 
persons whose tonsils had been removed, did it become apparent that such individuals 
had a statistically higher risk of childhood leukemia, Hodgkins disease, inflammatory 
bowel disease and rheumatoid arthritis, all suggesting a relationship to the importance of 
a fully intact immune system. While more work is required to elucidate such associations, 
they caution us to avoid arbitrary rules of thumb. Although there are legitimate reasons 
for tonsillectomy, which is done less frequently today, a recent study of variations in 
surgical rates revealed a higher risk of undergoing tonsillectomy among the general 
population when there were no medical friends or relatives than when there were.6 At 
least some of the general public, at least those who are friends and relatives of doctors it 
seems, have got the message.  
However, aside from some surgical procedures, it might be argued that medical 
diagnosis, unlike law, is not an irreversible act that can do untold damage to the status 
and reputation of the patient. Yet, is this assumption warranted? Consider the physician 
who suspects epilepsy in a truck driver: his patient will probably never drive a truck 
again if the diagnosis is made known to the licensing authorities. On the other hand, if he 
does drive, and has a seizure on the road, many people could be hurt. Similarly, some 
psychiatric diagnoses can have long term effects on a person's social standing. Consider 
also the dentist who tests positive on screening for hepatitis B or HIV. Such errors can 
indeed have consequences, and for this reason confirmatory tests are required. 
In fact, it may improve our clinical rigour if, in addition to clinically interesting cases at 
Grand Rounds, we also had regular sessions focusing on errors in clinical practice. These 
would consider conditions under which errors are more likely to occur, what type of 
errors, and their consequences, taking into account the condition being assessed, and type 
of physician involved, including type of training as error distribution will differ across 
disciplines, and none will be found immune to errors. Similarly, the individual 
circumstances of patients, such as educational background and ability to pay, will have a 
bearing on error rates, as these may affect their pretest likelihood of disease and quality 
of care. The organizational setting is also relevant, as patient volume, financing system, 
and cultural setting are also likely to influence outcome.  
In addition, system differences can profoundly affect results. For example, the US system 
of "fee for service" and high litigation rates produces more "errors of commission" 
related to excessive numbers of procedures, whereas in the UK system of "capitation", 
where physicians are paid salaries in proportion to the number of registered patients 
(regardless of clinical activity), there are more "errors of omission", or failure to take 
action. In either setting this can be viewed as "rational economic behavior". 
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